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NEWDOW v. RIO LINDA UNION  
SCHOOL DISTRICT:                 
RELIGIOUS COERCION IN PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
DESPITE VOLUNTARY NATURE OF 
PARTIALLY PATRIOTIC ACTIVITY 
INTRODUCTION 
Every morning before class, public school students in the Rio Linda 
Union School District in Northern California (hereinafter “School 
District”) stand, face the American flag, place their hands over their 
hearts, and recite the Pledge of Allegiance (hereinafter “Pledge”).1  This 
daily practice, on its face, is voluntary.2  However, public school 
students are a captive audience, one that is highly susceptible to the 
effects of coercive pressure and indoctrination.3  Despite its ostensibly 
voluntary nature, this governmental policy unconstitutionally pressures 
public school students to state that this nation exists under a monotheistic 
God.4  This policy stands in stark contrast to the purpose of the 
  1Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist. (Newdow V), 597 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992); Steven D. Smith, Why Is Government 
Speech Problematic? The Unnecessary Problem, the Unnoticed Problem, and the Big Problem, 87 
DEN. U. L. REV. 945, 950 (2010). 
 4 Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1012; Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the 
Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 65 (2004) (citing Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow I), 292 
F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he ‘under God’ amendment not only endorsed religion over 
nonreligion, it endorsed monotheism over polytheism.”). 
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Coercion Test is the determinative test in the context of government 
 
Establishment Clause5 of the United States Constitution, which states 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an estab
ion.”6 
Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District,7 a Ninth Circuit 
decision, is an alarming example of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  
The court in Newdow held that the School District’s policy of requiring 
daily patriotic exercises, including the recitation of the Pledge, did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.8  The decision allows public school 
districts in California to continue to coerce public school students into 
reciting the Pledge.  This decision and the School District’s policy have 
the unconstitutional effect of ostracizing nonbelievers and possibly 
indoctrinating some students with the belief in a monotheistic God.  
School policies that coerce students to support or participate in 
ld be struck down even if student participation is voluntary. 
The court’s holding in Newdow is wrong because the court 
incorrectly applied the Coercion Test.  The Coercion Test, first stated in 
Lee v. Weisman, is the determinative test in Establishment Clause 
challenges involving government action in public schools, because the 
test was specifically developed to address the problem of the captive 
student audience by analyzing whether the government activity has a 
coercive effect on students.9  If the court had applied the Coercion Test 
properly and examined the effect, not the purpose and primary nature, of 
the law and policy in question, the court would have properly found
aily recitation of the Pledge violated the Establishment Clause. 
This Note examines Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District 
and explains why California Education Code Section 52720 and the 
School District’s policy of reciting the Pledge violate the Establishment 
Clause.  Part I discusses the background facts and procedural history of 
the case and the three tests that were developed by the United States 
Supreme Court to analyze Establishment Clause challenges.  Part II 
examines the Ninth Circuit’s application of the three Establishment 
Clause tests to the facts of this case.  Finally, Part III explains why the 
 5 State action is subject to Establishment Clause challenges because the First Amendment is 
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1017, n.8 (citing Everson 
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947)). 
 6 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 7 Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1007. 
 8 Id. at 1042. 
 9 Modrovich v. Allegheny Cnty., 385 F.3d 397, 400-01 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Freiler v. 
Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 1999)); see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577 (1992). 
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action in public schools and why California Education Code Section 
52720 and the School District’s policy fail this test. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. FACTS AND HISTORY OF NEWDOW V. RIO LINDA UNION SCHOOL 
 DISTRICT 
1. Procedural History of Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District 
In 2000, Michael Newdow brought a claim against the Elk Grove 
Unified School District in California, alleging that the policy requiring 
recitation of the Pledge violated the Establishment Clause.10  After the 
district court dismissed his claim, a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, 
finding Newdow had standing to challenge the policy based on his being 
a father of a student in the Elk Grove Unified School District and holding 
that the Elk Grove School District policy violated the Establishment 
Clause (Newdow I).11  The mother of Newdow’s child intervened to 
challenge the decision and alleged that Michael Newdow lacked standing 
because she had previously been awarded sole legal custody of the 
child.12  Regarding the intervention challenging Newdow’s standing, the 
appellate court held that Newdow’s loss of custody did not deprive him 
of standing (Newdow II).13  The court issued an amended opinion 
reaffirming the invalidation of the Elk Grove School District policy in 
Newdow I, but it did not reach the question of the constitutionality of the 
Pledge (Newdow III).14 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and 
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Newdow III, holding that 
Newdow lacked standing because he was the noncustodial parent.15  
Because the Court found that Newdow lacked standing, the Court held 
that the Ninth Circuit should not have reached the merits of Newdow’s 
Establishment Clause claims.16 
In January 2005, following the 2004 Supreme Court decision in Elk 
 10 Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1015. 
 11 Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow I), 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 12 Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow II), 313 F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 13 Id. at 502-03. 
 14 Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow III), 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 15 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2004). 
 16 Id. at 17. 
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Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, Newdow and other plaintiffs, 
including Jan Roe, challenged the constitutionality of California 
Education Code Section 52720 and the related policies of various school 
districts within the State of California.17  Plaintiffs argued that the 
California law and the school districts’ policies violate the Establishment 
Clause of the United States Constitution.18  The Northern District of 
California held that Newdow III19 was binding on the district court and 
concluded that the school’s policy requiring recitation of the Pledge 
violated the Establishment Clause (Newdow IV).20 
2.  Plaintiff Jan Roe’s Constitutional Challenge of the School 
 District’s Policy 
The school district policies challenged in Newdow IV implement 
California Education Code Section 52720, which, in relevant part, states 
as follows: 
In every public elementary school each day during the school year at 
the beginning of the first regularly scheduled class or activity period at 
which the majority of the pupils of the school normally begin the 
schoolday, there shall be conducted appropriate patriotic exercises. 
The giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States 
of America shall satisfy the requirements of this section.21 
Pursuant to this state law, every morning in elementary schools in the 
School District, “willing students, led by their teachers, face the 
American Flag, place their right hands over their hearts, and recite the 
Pledge of Allegiance.”22  Plaintiff Jan Roe, whose child attended school 
in the School District, challenged the School District’s policy because 
the words “under God” in the Pledge offended her belief that there is no 
God.23  Therefore, Roe contended, the policy violates the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment.24 
There was no dispute over the fact that Jan Roe’s child never recited 
the Pledge, but Roe argued that the recitation of the Pledge in public 
 17 Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist. (Newdow V), 597 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Newdow III, 328 F.3d at 468-69. In Newdow III, the Ninth Circuit amended its Newdow I 
opinion and denied petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. 
 20 Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow IV), 383 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1240-41 (E.D. Cal. 2005). 
 21 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52720 (Westlaw 2011). 
 22 Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1012. 
 23 Id. at 1012-13. 
 24 Id. 
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elementary schools interfered “with her right to direct her child’s 
upbringing, and indoctrinate[d] her child with the belief that God 
exists.”25  The district court, relying on Newdow III, held that the School 
District’s policy did violate the Establishment Clause.26 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling in Newdow 
IV,27 reasoning in part that because Newdow III was reversed by the 
United States Supreme Court, the district court should not have relied on 
it as binding precedent (Newdow V).28  Additionally, the court of appeals 
reasoned that Congress changed the law since Newdow III, in response to 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Newdow I.29  In Newdow V, the Ninth 
Circuit held that “California Education Code § 52720 and the School 
District’s Policy of having teachers lead students in the daily recitation of 
the Pledge, and allowing those who do not wish to participate to refuse to 
do so with impunity, do not violate the Establishment Clause.”30 
B. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE 
 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides the constitutional basis for religious freedom 
in America.31  The Establishment Clause states, “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion.”32  The Supreme Court of 
the United States has developed three distinct tests to determine whether 
a governmental action has violated the Establishment Clause: 1) the 
Lemon Test, 2) the Endorsement Test, and 3) the Coercion Test.33 
 25 Id. at 1012-13; see Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(en banc) (“Parents have a right to direct the religious upbringing of their children and, on that basis, 
have standing to protect their right.”). 
 26 Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1015-16. 
 27 Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow IV), 383 F.Supp.2d 1229, 1240 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (holding 
that despite being reversed on procedural grounds, the decision in Newdow III that the school 
districts’ policies violated the Establishment Clause was binding precedent). 
 28 Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1040-41. 
 29 Id. at 1041; Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow I), 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that adding the phrase “under God” to the Pledge was unconstitutional, and the school 
district’s policy requiring daily recitation of the Pledge violated the Establishment Clause). 
 30 Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1042. 
 31 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1017. 
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1. The Lemon Test 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, decided in 1971, the Supreme Court had to 
determine, among other issues, whether Pennsylvania and Rhode Island 
statutes that provided religious elementary and secondary schools with 
aid for teachers’ salaries and educational materials violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.34  The Rhode Island 
statute allowed government officials to pay nonpublic school teachers 
who taught secular subjects up to 15% of the teachers’ annual salaries.35  
The statute also required the teachers to teach only secular subjects that 
were taught in the public schools and to use only materials that were 
used in the public schools.36  The statute further specified that the 
average per-pupil expenditure for secular education at the receiving 
teacher’s school had to be less than the average in the public school 
system.37 
The Pennsylvania statute provided direct reimbursement to 
nonpublic schools for expenses for teachers’ salaries, textbooks and 
instructional materials.38  Reimbursement was restricted to secular 
courses available in the public schools, including mathematics, foreign 
languages, physical science and physical education.39  The statute set out 
further restrictions prohibiting the reimbursement for any course that 
contained “any subject matter expressing religious teaching, or the 
morals or forms of worship of any sect.”40 
The Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes were clear in their 
intent to advance secular education within each respective state.41  “A 
State always has a legitimate concern for maintaining minimum 
standards in all schools it allows to operate.”42  In crafting the statutes, 
the legislatures of both states provided precautions in recognition that the 
effect of the statutes could cause constitutional concern, because the 
legislatures were aware that statutes would benefit private schools with 
religious affiliations.43  In doing so, the legislatures probably intended to 
 34 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971). 
 35 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 et seq. (repealed 1980); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607. 
 36 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 et seq. (repealed 1980); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 608. 
 37 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 et seq. (repealed 1980); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607. 
 38 24 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5609 (repealed 1977); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 609. 
 39 24 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5609 (repealed 1977); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 610. 
 40 24 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5609 (repealed 1977); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 610. 
 41 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 et seq. (repealed 1980); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5609 
(repealed 1977); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. 
 42 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. 
 43 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-51-1 et seq. (repealed 1980); 24 PA STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5609 
(repealed 1977); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. 
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prevent constitutional questions from arising, but in the end, the Supreme 
Court found “the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising 
under the statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between 
government and religion.”44 
While the purpose and primary effect of the statutes may have been 
secular in nature, the Supreme Court found that the excessive 
entanglement of government with religion invalidated the two statutes.45  
In deciding to invalidate the two state statutes, the Supreme Court 
combined criteria that had been developed over years of Establishment 
Clause cases.46  The culmination of these developments took form in the 
three-pronged Lemon Test.47  A governmental action will be upheld 
under the Lemon Test if  1) there is a secular governmental purpose, 2) 
the principal or primary effect is neutral and neither advances nor 
inhibits religion, and 3) the action does not excessively entangle the 
government with religion.48 
2. The Endorsement Test 
The Endorsement Test finds its origins in a concurring opinion in 
Lynch v. Donnelly.49  In this concurrence, Justice O’Connor reasoned 
that if the purpose of an action is not to endorse religion and the effect of 
the action does not convey a message of endorsing religion, then the 
challenged action does not violate the Establishment Clause.50  The 
central question, then, in the Endorsement Test inquiry is “what viewers 
may fairly understand to be the purpose of the [government action].”51  If 
a reasonable observer would fairly understand a governmental action to 
be an endorsement of religion over non-religion, or of one religion over 
another, then the governmental action fails the Endorsement Test.52 
 44 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-14. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 612-13. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  In Lynch v. 
Donnelly, the Supreme Court held that the city of Pawtucket’s display of a crèche along with other 
holiday displays did not violate the Establishment Clause.  In a concurring opinion, which is the 
basis for the Endorsement Test, Justice O’Connor reasoned that the display was constitutional 
because the purpose of the display was not to endorse religion and the effect did not convey a 
message of endorsement of religion. 
 50 Id. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (quoting Capitol Square 
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment)). 
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The Supreme Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU adopted 
Justice O’Connor’s “sound analytical framework for evaluating 
governmental use of religious symbols” from her concurrence in 
Lynch.53  The Court agreed with the notion that any endorsement of 
religion is invalid.54  Accordingly, the Endorsement Test focuses on 
whether the government action in question has the effect of favoring or 
preferring religion in general, or favoring a particular religious belief 
over another.55  Understanding the context in which the challenged 
government action took place is extremely important for an Endorsement 
Test analysis.56  In County of Allegheny, the Court held that the display 
of a crèche did violate the establishment clause, but the display of a 
menorah next to a Christmas tree among other winter-holiday-themed 
items did not.57 
The concept of the “reasonable observer” has morphed since its 
inception.  Recently, in Good News Club v. Milford Central School, a 
2001 Supreme Court decision, the Court relied on another concurring 
opinion of Justice O’Connor, from the case of Capitol Square Review & 
Advisory Board v. Pinette: 
[B]ecause our concern is with the political community writ large, the 
endorsement inquiry is not about the perceptions of particular 
individuals or saving isolated nonadherents from . . . discomfort . . . . 
It is for this reason that the reasonable observer in the endorsement 
inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context of the 
community and forum in which the religious [speech takes place].58 
Thus, the Court in Good News Club “decline[d] to employ Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence using a modified heckler’s veto” (i.e., a subjective 
standard from an individual perspective) in favor of the reasonable-
observer standard, “aware of the history and context of the community 
and forum.”59  Therefore, one person’s perception that a governmental 
action is an endorsement of religion is not enough to invalidate that 
action.60  Instead, the objective reasonable-observer standard relies on 
 53 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989). 
 54 Id. (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 55 Id. at 593-94. 
 56 Id. at 595. 
 57 Id. at 578-79. 
 58 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (quoting Capitol Square 
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment)). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
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the perspective of the hypothetical reasonable person who is aware of the 
history and context of the governmental action at issue.61 
3. The Coercion Test 
In an essential Establishment Clause case regarding religious 
activity and public schools, Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court had to 
decide whether a school policy of allowing clergy members to offer 
prayers at the school’s official graduation ceremony violated the First 
Amendment.62  In making its decision, the Court declined to reconsider 
the entire constitutional framework established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
because the school policy allowing prayers at an official graduation 
ceremony was pervasive governmental involvement with religion.63  
Instead, the Court applied the fundamental principle that the 
government’s obligation to accommodate religion in some situations 
never overcomes the “fundamental limitations imposed by the 
Establishment Clause.”64  The crux of the Coercion Test is that “at a 
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce 
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”65 
The Court explained the different mechanisms by which the First 
Amendment protects speech and religion, to illustrate that the 
Establishment Clause imposes greater limits on government action 
regarding religion than it does on government action regarding speech.66  
The First Amendment protects speech by ensuring full expression by all, 
including the government.67  The Free Exercise Clause is similar to the 
speech provisions in that all citizens have the freedom to engage in 
religious activity without fear of government prohibition.68  However, 
unlike the Free Speech Clause, the Establishment Clause specifically 
prohibits the government from meddling with religion.69  Lee explains 
that “in the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant 
expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and 
coerce.”70 
 61 Id. 
 62 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992). 
 63 Id. at 587. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 591. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id.  
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 591-92. 
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A federal district court in Florida attempted to clarify the Coercion 
Test announced in Lee.71  That court defined unconstitutional coercion as 
occurring when “(1) the government directs (2) a formal religious 
exercise (3) in such a way as to oblige the participation of objectors.”72  
However, the Supreme Court has declined to provide lower courts with a 
definition of a “formal religious exercise.”73  Despite failing to define 
“formal religious exercise,” the Supreme Court has made it clear that 
“subtle coercive pressure” can be enough to interfere with an individual’s 
choice to participate in religion or not, and this subtle pressure is enough 
to make a governmental action unconstitutional.74 
According to the Second Circuit, the Coercion Test inquiry should 
be decided based on considerations of “individual conscience and free 
will.”75  In contrast, the Fifth Circuit conflates the contextual element of 
the Endorsement Test with the Coercion Test by requiring the court to 
examine the context in which the challenged governmental action took 
place.76  The Fifth Circuit stated that the “ultimate question is whether 
‘the religious component of any government practice or policy . . . 
overwhelm[s] the nonreligious portions.’”77  This construction, however, 
is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Lee, in which the 
Court stated the minimal constitutional limitation of the Establishment 
Clause prevents the government from coercing anyone to participate or 
support religious activity.78  Lee said nothing about weighing religious 
and nonreligious components of the activity. 
Other circuits have drawn distinctions in Establishment Clause 
cases involving public universities.  The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have 
highlighted the fundamental difference between cases involving 
elementary and secondary school children and cases in which adult 
college-level students are exposed to religion through state action.79  
 71 Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446, 456 (M.D. Fla. 1994), aff’d in part and 
vacated in part on other grounds, 112 F.3d 1475 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d 274, 290 (5th Cir. 1999) (striking 
down the school district’s policy for “Clergy in Schools” volunteer counseling program by focusing 
on the “design, implementation, and effect” of the challenged conduct, not its “purpose or goal”). 
 74 DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Grp., Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 412 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Lee, 
505 U.S. at 592, 595; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311-13 (2000)). 
 75 DeStefano, 247 F.3d at 412. 
 76 Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 170 (5th Cir. 2010) (upholding the recitation of the Texas 
state pledge of allegiance in public schools). 
 77 Croft, 624 F.3d at 170 (citing Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d at 291). 
 78 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
 79 See Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 239 (6th Cir. 1997) (“We may safely assume 
that doctors of philosophy are less susceptible to religious indoctrination than children are.”); see 
also Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that “there was no coercion – real 
10
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Adult students are less susceptible to undue coercion than school 
children, so the special concerns present in Lee are generally absent in 
the university setting.80  However, the Fourth Circuit created an 
exception to this general rule by striking down school-sponsored supper 
prayer at Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in Mellen v. Bunting.81  In 
Mellen, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that VMI school officials should be 
prohibited from leading prayer, because of the inherently coercive nature 
of the military school’s educational system.82  “Because of VMI’s 
coercive atmosphere, the Establishment Clause precludes school officials 
from sponsoring an official prayer, even for mature adults.”83  
Significantly, the court further stated that the voluntary nature of the 
supper prayer did not prevent it from being unconstitutionally coercive.84  
The court reasoned that despite being nominally voluntary, communal 
dining was effectively obligatory, and the imposition of a supper prayer 
“exact[ed] an unconstitutional toll on the consciences of religious 
objectors.”85 
II. NINTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TESTS 
 TO CALIFORNIA EDUCATION CODE SECTION 52720 AND RIO LINDA 
 UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT’S POLICY 
In making its decision in Newdow V, the Ninth Circuit correctly 
applied the rules developed by the Lemon Test and the Endorsement 
Test, finding that the California statute and the Rio Linda Union School 
District policy pass those tests.86  However, the court misapplied the 
Coercion Test, which is the determinative test in this context, by 
erroneously focusing on the purpose of the governmental activity and not 
on the effect of the policy, which is to unconstitutionally coerce 
elementary and secondary students to support or participate in religious 
or otherwise – to participate” because the special concerns underlying Lee were not present at a 
commencement ceremony at Indiana University). 
 80 Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 239; Tanford, 104 F.3d at 985. 
 81 Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 82 Id. at 371-72. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Id. at 372. 
 85 Id.  
 86 Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist. (Newdow V), 597 F.3d 1007, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 
2010).  The Ninth Circuit concluded that under the Lemon Test, the School District’s policy had a 
secular purpose to encourage patriotic exercises, the primary effect was to conduct patriotic 
exercises and there was no excessive entanglement with religion.  Under the Endorsement Test, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that a reasonable observer, aware of the history of the Pledge, would be 
aware that the phrase “under God” is meant not as an endorsement of religion, but rather as a 
patriotic reflection on the political philosophy of our founding fathers. Id. 
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activity.87 
The Ninth Circuit held that the School District’s policy does not 
violate the Coercion Test because the voluntary recitation of the Pledge 
is a patriotic exercise, not a religious exercise.88  The court relied heavily 
on the distinction between patriotic mentions of God and “unquestioned 
religious exercise[s],” like prayer.89 
The court supported its position by reasoning that children are 
routinely coerced to do things in school, including listening to other 
students recite the Pledge.90  The court found that in this case, “the 
students are being coerced to participate in a patriotic exercise, not a 
religious exercise.”91  The court explained that the indirect-
psychological-coercion analysis of Lee only applies to religion or its 
exercises, which carry “a particular risk of indirect coercion.”92  
According to the court, this indirect coercion does not apply to patriotic 
exercises.93  In support of this conclusion, the court cited a Fourth Circuit 
case in which a parent challenged a Virginia statute that required the 
recitation of the Pledge in Virginia’s public schools, for the notion that 
“[e]ven assuming that the recitation of the Pledge contains a risk of 
indirect coercion, the indirect coercion is not threatening to establish 
religion, but patriotism.”94  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit cited Engel v. 
Vitale, a 1962 school prayer case in which the Supreme Court 
distinguished reciting historical documents or singing patriotic songs 
with religious overtones from prayer in public schools.95  The Ninth 
Circuit referred to this distinction as the difference between prayer and 
“a ceremonial reference to God.”96 
The Ninth Circuit found it proper to limit the indirect-coercion 
analysis of Lee to religious exercises.97  In addition to this limitation, the 
court stated that when there is not a requirement to recite the Pledge, the 
Establishment Clause is violated “only if the government coerces 
students to engage in a religious exercise.”98  The court found that 
patriotic activities, such as recitation of the Pledge, are not religious and 
 87 Id. at 1038-40. 
 88 Id. at 1040. 
 89 Id. at 1038-40. 
 90 Id. at 1038. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 1038-39 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992)). 
 93 Id. (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 592). 
 94 Id. at 1040 (citing Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 408 (4th Cir. 2005)). 
 95 Id. (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962)). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 1039. 
 98 Id. at 1040. 
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what the proper standard 
is. 
the government does not coerce free citizens to unwillingly support or 
 
therefore not analyzed under the Coercion Test.99  Because the court was 
able to make a distinction between “patriotic mentions of God” and 
religious exercises, the Ninth Circuit held that the “School District’s 
Policy providing for the voluntary recitation of the Pledge does not 
violate the Lee Coercion Test.”100 
III. CRITIQUE OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
 ANALYSIS 
A. THE COERCION TEST IS THE DETERMINATIVE TEST IN 
 ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENTAL 
 ACTION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s accurate analysis of this case’s facts 
under the Lemon Test and the Endorsement Test, that analysis was 
unnecessary and misleading.  Since its inception in Lee v. Weisman, the 
Coercion Test has been the applicable test in First Amendment 
Establishment Clause challenges to government actions related to public 
schools.101  “[The Coercion Test] focuses primarily on government 
action in public education and examines whether school-sponsored 
religious activity has a coercive effect on students.”102  For consistency 
and clarity, the Coercion Test should have been the only Establishment 
Clause test applied in Newdow V, because the government action 
challenged was an establishment of religion in public schools.103  
Analysis involving three different tests creates confusion and only leads 
to uncertainty in future Establishment Clause challenges related to public 
schools.  Courts should use the test specifically developed for this 
situation, the Coercion Test, so everyone knows 
One main purpose of the Establishment Clause is to guarantee that 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992); see Modrovich v. Allegheny Cnty., 385 F.3d 
397, 400 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 343 (5th 
Cir. 1999)). 
 102 Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 400 (citing Freiler, 185 F.3d at 343, cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1251 
(2000)). 
 103 See generally Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446, 450-51 n.5 (M.D. Fla. 
1994), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 112 F.3d 1475 (11th Cir. 1997).  The 
Supreme Court has decided Establishment Clause cases without using all three Establishment Clause 
tests. 
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participate in religion or the exercise of religion.104  Religious coercion 
of school children by the government is unacceptable because parents 
have the right to decide whether to raise their children to be religious and 
to believe in God.105  The fundamental right of parents to direct the 
religious upbringing of their children has significance in our society.106  
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin law 
because it violated Amish107 parents’ First Amendment right to religious 
freedom by requiring students to remain in school until age sixteen.108  
Similarly, in Grove v. Mead School District No. 354, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that a parent had standing to challenge the use of a book in 
the school district’s English curriculum, based on her right to “direct the 
religious training of her child.”109 
The Coercion Test was developed in Lee to protect the individual’s 
freedom of conscience.110  Federal, state and local governments of the 
United States have the affirmative duty to protect American citizens’ 
freedom to choose their religious beliefs.111  If the government fails to 
protect “that sphere of inviolable conscience and belief which is the mark 
of a free people,” the United States loses its power to influence other 
nations to afford equivalent fundamental rights to their citizens.112  When 
the government coerces citizens to participate in religion, the government 
compromises freedom of belief and conscience, “which are the sole 
assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed.”113 
The concern over freedom of conscience is certainly not limited to 
the public school context, but it is “most pronounced” there.114  The 
 104 Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. 
 105 See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) 
(“Parents have a right to direct the religious upbringing of their children and, on that basis, have 
standing to protect their right.” (citing Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1532 (9th 
Cir. 1985); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 309 n.4 (1952))). 
 106 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972). 
 107 Id. at 211 (“Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary to Amish 
beliefs, not only because it places Amish children in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs with 
increasing emphasis on competition in class work and sports and with pressure to conform to the 
styles, manners, and ways of the peer group, but also because it takes them away from their 
community, physically and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life.”). 
 108 Id. 
 109 Grove, 753 F.2d at 1532 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)). 
 110 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-93 (1992). 
 111 Id. at 592 (“One timeless lesson is that if citizens are subjected to state-sponsored religious 
exercises, the State disavows its own duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience 
and belief which is the mark of a free people.”). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
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Establishment Clause prohibits the government from putting elementary 
and secondary school students in the position of choosing whether to 
participate in or protest activities contrary to their religious 
convictions.115  “What to most believers may seem nothing more than a 
reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, 
in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an 
attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious 
orthodoxy.”116  When the potential for “subtle coercive pressure” occurs 
in public schools, there are profound concerns with protecting 
elementary and secondary school students from such coercion.117  In the 
school context, “subtle and indirect” government pressure can effectively 
coerce a student to engage in activity that is contrary to the dissenting 
student’s conscientious convictions, a result the Establishment Clause 
was designed to prevent.118 
B. NEWDOW’S APPLICATION IS INCORRECT, AND CALIFORNIA 
 EDUCATION CODE SECTION 52720 AND THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S 
 POLICY ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE COERCION TEST 
The Newdow court incorrectly applied the Coercion Test by 
focusing on the purpose and nature of the activity rather than the effect.  
The majority decision in Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District 
(Newdow V) expressly recognized the fact that elementary school 
children “unaware of its history may perceive the phrase ‘under God’ in 
the Pledge to refer exclusively to a monotheistic God of a particular 
religion.”119  The California statute and the School District’s policy 
should be invalidated under the Coercion Test because an elementary 
school student, unaware of the history, might believe the phrase “under 
God” refers to the God of a particular religion.  This is the type of effect 
that the Coercion Test is designed to protect against and why California 
Education Code Section 52720 and the School District’s policy are 
unconstitutional.   
School policies that impermissibly coerce students to support or 
participate in religion should be struck down even if student participation 
is ostensibly voluntary.  In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 
the United States Supreme Court invalidated a school policy that allowed 
student-led prayers at high school football games, because the policy 
 115 Id. at 593. 
 116 Id. at 592. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 593. 
 119 Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist. (Newdow V), 597 F.3d 1007, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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violated the Establishment Clause.120  The Court found that “the delivery 
of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing those present to 
participate in an act of religious worship.”121  Similarly, the daily 
recitation of the Pledge has the improper effect of coercing public school 
children to declare that this nation exists “under God.”  It is difficult, if 
not impossible, to separate the idea that this nation exists under God with 
the notion that the individuals of this nation also exist under God.122  
Forcing students to state the existence of God impermissibly coerces 
students to accept religion over non-religion (and monotheism over 
polytheism), which, under the First Amendment, should be done freely, 
not at the risk of ostracism.123 
The voluntary nature of a school policy does not exclude the 
possibility of unconstitutional coercion.  In Santa Fe, the Court stated 
that although the football games were voluntary school-sponsored 
events, many students were effectively forced through social norms to 
attend the games.124  In Newdow, the School District’s policy allowed 
voluntary student participation.125  However, unlike in Santa Fe, students 
in the Rio Linda Union School District must attend school during the 
time the Pledge is recited.126  Despite being a voluntary recitation of the 
Pledge, elementary school students are unlikely to act out by electing not 
to participate,127 especially when the teacher is leading and the other 
students are following, as the court in Newdow acknowledged.128  As in 
Lee v. Weisman and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the 
voluntary nature of the school-sponsored event is not a determinative 
factor when deciding whether unconstitutional religious coercion took 
place.129  The determining factor is whether the government action has 
the effect of coercing anyone “to support or participate in religion or its 
exercise.”130 
 120 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 9, 69-70 (2004). 
 123 Id. at 62. 
 124 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 312. 
 125 Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist. (Newdow V), 597 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 126 Id. at 1012; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 et seq. (Westlaw 2011). 
 127 See generally B. Bradford Brown et al., Perceptions of Peer Pressure, Peer Conformity 
Dispositions, and Self-Reported Behavior Among Adolescents, 22 DEV’L PSYCHOL. 521 (1986)  
Respondents in this study of 1,027 students from grades 6-12 were more willing to follow peers in 
neutral, socializing behavior activities than antisocial, misconduct activities. 
 128 Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1038. 
 129 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586, 595 (1992); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290. 
 130 Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. 
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There are profound concerns with protecting public elementary and 
secondary school students from “subtle coercive pressure” because 
public school students are subjected to the voice of the government.131  
As the dissent in Newdow noted: 
The Supreme Court has never lost sight of the special danger 
presented by the promotion of religious views by public school 
teachers: In over six decades of adjudicating Establishment Clause 
challenges, the Supreme Court has never once upheld a statute or 
practice that promotes religion or religious beliefs in public schools or 
that coerces students to express or adopt any religious views.132 
California Education Code Section 52720 and the School District’s 
policy directly infringe on the individual conscience of a group 
especially susceptible to that type of “subtle coercive pressure,” namely, 
elementary school students.133 
While the pressures that exist to recite the Pledge may not be 
blatant, the indirect effects of peer pressure and teacher acceptance are 
enough to make a non-religious public school student feel pressured to 
participate in activity that is contrary to that student’s religious beliefs.  
Subtle, indirect coercion can be “as real as any overt compulsion.”134  
“What to most believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable 
request that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a school 
context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to 
employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.”135  
A policy that requires voluntary recitation of the Pledge fails the 
Coercion Test because it produces an unconstitutionally coercive effect 
on students to participate in the “voluntary” recitation and state that the 
United States of America exists under God. 
The Newdow court’s acknowledgment that children are coerced to 
do things in school constantly, like learning to read and solve math 
problems,136 failed to address the core issue of whether requiring 
 131 Id. at 592. 
 132 Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1095-96 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 530 U.S. 290; Lee, 505 U.S. 577; Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 
97 (1968); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421 (1962)). 
 133 Steven D. Smith, Why Is Government Speech Problematic? The Unnecessary Problem, the 
Unnoticed Problem, and the Big Problem, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 945, 950 (2010). 
 134 Lee, 505 U.S. at 593. 
 135 Id. at 592. 
 136 Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1038 (majority opinion). 
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voluntary recitation of the Pledge in public schools violates the 
Establishment Clause because the recitation coerces pupils to support or 
participate in religion.  While the court conceded that elementary school 
children are coerced to listen to the teacher and other students recite the 
Pledge, the court determined that the recitation of the Pledge is a 
patriotic exercise, not a religious one.137  The court ignored the effect of 
the recitation of the Pledge and neglected to recognize that “a program’s 
purpose [can be] logically distinct from the program’s actual 
character.”138  While the recitation of the Pledge is certainly a patriotic 
exercise whose purpose is facially patriotic in nature,139 the actual 
character of the Pledge has strong religious overtones that should not be 
ignored.140 
There is a particular risk of indirect coercion through peer pressure 
and teacher acceptance in Newdow specifically because the Pledge is not 
an explicitly religious exercise.  The court erroneously stated that the 
“indirect psychological analysis” in Lee v. Weisman only applies to 
“religion or to religious exercises, which carry ‘a particular risk of 
indirect coercion.’”141  The court skirted the real issue that because the 
students are effectively coerced to recite the Pledge or to hear other 
students recite the Pledge, led by the authority of a public school teacher, 
the students are at an unconstitutionally high risk of indirect coercion to 
make the statement that this nation exists under God.  The high risk of 
coercion stems from the fact that public school students are a captive 
audience,142 compelled by law to attend school under California’s 
compulsory education law.143 
In Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District, the coercion may be 
indirect, but it is also real and apparent because elementary and 
secondary school students are effectively pressured to state that this 
nation exists under God.  For some students, this will undoubtedly be 
contrary to their and their parents’ religious beliefs or nonbeliefs and will 
alienate them from their peers.  For others, especially young elementary 
 137 Id. 
 138 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d 274, 290 (5th Cir. 1999) (striking 
down the school district’s policy for “Clergy in Schools” volunteer counseling program by focusing 
on the “design, implementation, and effect” of the challenged conduct, not its “purpose or goal”). 
 139 Whether or not the Pledge, as amended in 1954, is constitutional under the Establishment 
Clause is beyond the scope of this Case Note. 
 140 Newdow V, 597 F.3d at 1095-96 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. Rep. 107-659, at 5) 
(“[T]he Pledge ‘is a recognition of the fact that many Americans believe in God.’”). 
 141 Id. at 1039 (majority opinion) (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586, 592 (1992). 
 142 Steven D. Smith, Why Is Government Speech Problematic? The Unnecessary Problem, the 
Unnoticed Problem, and the Big Problem, 87 DEN. U. L. REV. 945, 950 (2010). 
 143 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 et seq. (Westlaw 2011). 
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school students, the belief or nonbelief in God may not yet have formed.  
By forcing these students to recite, or at least to hear other students 
recite, the Pledge led by their teacher, the School District is engaging in 
activity that violates the Establishment Clause and interferes with the 
parents’ right to direct the religious upbringing of their children.144 
An additional roadblock often encountered in Coercion Test 
analysis is the fact that the Supreme Court has failed to define “formal 
religious exercise.”145  Instead, lower courts are left to guess at its 
meaning.  At the very least, “formal religious exercise” must include 
prayer and worship services, because these activities are the essence of 
outward manifestations of religion.  However, the phrase “formal 
religious exercise” could also encompass a broad spectrum of “exercise” 
including the profession of a belief in the existence of God.  Because the 
choice to accept or reject religion is guaranteed by the Constitution,146 it 
is best to define “formal religious exercise” broadly to include expressing 
a belief in the existence of God.  After all, expressing such belief is a 
tenet of Islam, Christianity and Judaism, three major world religions.147 
The dissenting opinion in Newdow points out two Supreme Court 
cases, decided before the Coercion Test was announced in Lee, that 
struck down state practices because of coercive effects on students 
despite not being religious exercises.148  In Stone v. Graham, the 
Supreme Court invalidated a Kentucky statute that required the posting 
of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms, because the 
statute had  the effect of “‘[inducing] the school-children to read, 
meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the [Ten] 
Commandments.’”149  Sitting in a room with a copy of the Ten 
Commandments is not likely to be considered a religious exercise, no 
 144 Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
 145 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d 274, 290 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 146 Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 9, 65 (2004). 
 147 Richard Hooker, The Five Pillars, WASHINGTON ST. U., 
http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/5PILLARS.HTM (last updated July 14, 1999) (stating that 
Shahadah is the core of Islamic faith and requires Muslims to express, “There is not God but God 
and Muhammad is the messenger of God”); Charles Hedrick, What Are Major Christian Beliefs?, 
SOC.RELIGION.CHRISTIAN, http://geneva.rutgers.edu/src/christianity/major.html (last visited Apr. 6, 
2011) (stating that many of the basic Christian beliefs can be found in the common Christian prayer, 
the Apostles’ Creed, “I believe in God, the Father Almighty, creator of Heaven and Earth”); Tracey 
Rich, What do Jews Believe?, JUDAISM 101, http://www.jewfaq.org/beliefs.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 
2011) (stating that Rambam’s thirteen principles of faith include the belief that God exists). 
 148 Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist. (Newdow V), 597 F.3d 1007, 1098-1100 (9th Cir. 
2010) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Stone v. 
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)). 
 149 Id. at 1099 (quoting Stone, 449 U.S. at 42). 
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matter how broadly construed.150  As an example of where “subtle 
coercive pressure” can arise, the Court in Lee cited Edwards v. 
Aguillard.151  In Edwards, the Court invalidated a Louisiana statute that 
required creation science to be taught in public schools.152  Including 
teaching the critiques of scientific theory from a religious viewpoint in a 
definition of “religious exercise” would require a very broad definition of 
that term,153 rendering the term nearly meaningless.  While these two 
cases were decided before the Coercion Test was announced in Lee, they 
do give weight to the reasoning that “Lee must be understood to hold, as 
it explicitly states, ‘that government may not coerce anyone to support or 
participate in religion or its exercise.’”154  Using this logic, the voluntary 
recitation of the Pledge, whether a religious exercise or not, led by 
teachers in Rio Linda Union School District should be invalidated as 
unconstitutional coercion to support or participate in religion. 
CONCLUSION 
Public school students are a captive audience whose minds the 
government has broad power to shape and influence in a number of 
ways.  Even though the recitation of the Pledge is voluntary, public 
school students should not be coerced to support or participate in the 
religious activity of acknowledging the existence of God, which is an 
integral part of reciting the Pledge.  Religious freedom requires 
governmental neutrality to ensure citizens the right to practice religion as 
well as the right not to practice religion.155  The Establishment Clause is 
meant to ensure these rights.156  A policy that effectively forces 
elementary school children to state a belief in a monotheistic God is in 
direct conflict with this principle of American democracy. 
Despite strenuous efforts by proponents of reciting the Pledge in 
public schools, there is not one compelling argument that the phrase 
“under God” is not religious in nature.  While there is historical 
significance in the phrase “under God” regarding the history of the 
formation of our country, there can be no doubt that the word God 
denotes religion.  Not only is the phrase “under God” religious in nature, 
 150 Id.  
 151 Id. at 1099 n.86 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992)). 
 152 Id. at 1098-99 (citing Edwards, 482 U.S. 578). 
 153 Id. at 1099. 
 154 Id. at 1090 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 587). 
 155 McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 
393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). 
 156 Id. at 860 (quoting Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104). 
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it is monotheistic in nature.157  The monotheistic nature of the phrase 
“under God”158 compounds the Establishment Clause violation.  The 
phrase favors not only religion over non-religion, but monotheistic 
religion over polytheistic religion.159 
Under the Establishment Clause, and particularly under the 
Coercion Test, public school students should not be forced to support or 
participate in this religious activity.  Undoubtedly, supporters of the 
California law and the School District’s policy will continue to point to 
the patriotic purpose and the voluntary nature of the policy.  These 
arguments, however, are not enough to protect religious freedom in the 
way the Constitution mandates.  The Constitution requires that the 
government not establish or favor religion over non-religion, or one 
religion over another.  California Education Code Section 52720 and the 
School District’s policy do both, thus violating the Establishment Clause. 
DANIEL D. BLOM* 
 
 157 Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 9, 65 (2004) (citing Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow I), 292 F.3d 597, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“[T]he ‘under God’ amendment not only endorsed religion over nonreligion, it endorsed 
monotheism over polytheism.”). 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
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